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1. Taking Material Culture Seriously 
 
In a rich and thought-provoking paper, Lambros Malafouris argues that taking 
material culture seriously means to be ‘systematically concerned with figuring out 
the causal efficacy of materiality in the enactment and constitution of a cognitive 
system or operation’ (Malafouris 2004, 55).  As I understand this view, there are 
really two intertwined claims to be established. The first is that the things beyond 
the skin that make up material culture (in other words, the physical objects and 
artefacts in which cultural networks and systems of human social relations are 
realized) may be essential to the enactment of, and be partly constitutive of, certain 
cognitive systems or operations. The consequence of establishing this claim is 
supposed to be that we have a mandate to recast the boundaries of the mind so as 
to include, as proper parts of the mind, things located beyond the skin. Thus, in 
talking about the contribution of the world to cognition, Malafouris (2004, 58) 
concludes that ‘what we have traditionally construed as an active or passive but 
always clearly separated external stimulus for setting a cognitive mechanism into 
motion, may be after all a continuous part of the machinery itself; at least ex 
hypothesi’. This is the position that, in philosophical circles, is known increasingly  
as the extended mind hypothesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Menary forthcoming). 
Henceforth I shall refer to this hypothesis as EM. A stock example will help bring 
the idea into view. Rumelhart et al. (1986) note that most of us solve difficult 
multiplication problems by using ‘pen and paper’ as an external resource. This 
environmental prop enables us to transform a difficult cognitive problem into a set 
of simpler ones, and to temporarily store the results of  certain intermediate 
calculations. For the fan of EM, the distributed combination of this external 
resource and certain inner psychological processes constitutes a cognitive system 
in its own right.  
 
The second claim that Malafouris needs to establish is that when things-
beyond-the-skin achieve the status of being essential to the enactment of, and 
partly constitutive of, certain cognitive systems or operations, they often do so in 
virtue of a kind of causal contribution that is, in some way to be determined, a 
product of those things’ essential materiality, rather than in virtue of some other 
kind of causal contribution. (I shall later identify the former kind of causal 
contribution as one that involves vital materiality and the latter as one that 
involves only implementational materiality.) One implication of this second claim 
is that for EM be characterized correctly, it needs to pay more than lip service to 
what we might call the very materiality of material culture. 
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It is worth noting that, in the context of Malafouris’ interests, the pay-off 
from adopting EM is plausibly nothing less than a reconfiguration of the 
intellectual landscape inhabited by the discipline known as cognitive archaeology. 
Consider the question ‘What does a Palaeolithic stone tool do for the mind?’. 
Conventional cognitive archaeology is committed to an ‘in-the-head’ ontology of 
mind. This condemns material culture to a life outside of cognition proper, and so 
the things studied by cognitive archaeology are (roughly) things that minds have 
made and/or used. The cognitive states and processes concerned are not 
themselves on show in those things, although certain inferences about the nature of 
those states and processes, inferences of an unavoidably hazardous nature, might 
be ventured. However, if past ways of thought were not just expressed in material 
culture but were often partly constituted by material culture, as EM implies, then 
cognitive archaeology gets to study past minds in a rather more direct fashion. In 
fact, the things studied by cognitive archaeology are literally parts of (no longer 
functioning) minds. If this is right, then the interdisciplinary collective that is 
cognitive science is poised to welcome a new member of the team.    
 
So where are we going in this paper? In what follows I shall spell out what 
I take to be the only plausible reading of what is the canonical statement of EM, 
and argue that, on this reading, the distinctive EM conclusion is purchased using a 
currency of what I shall call ‘implementational materiality’. I shall also submit 
evidence that Malafouris would judge such implementational materiality to be an 
inadequate basis for capturing the full cognitive life of things. This goes some way 
towards breaking the link between Malafouris’ vision of what it is to take material 
culture seriously and EM. To go the rest of the distance, I shall argue that the 
enactive aspect of Malafouris’ approach – recall that we are concerned with the 
causal efficacy of materiality in the enactment and constitution of a cognitive 
system or operation – is plausibly in tension with EM. If this is right, then taking 
material culture seriously in the way that Malafouris urges us to, will actually 
require us to give up on EM.    
 
Although I have just set things up in terms of a critical response to 
Malafouris’ paper, and although I shall refer back to the argument of that paper as 
the present investigation unfolds, let me stress at the outset that my real target here 
is certainly not Malafouris, but rather an increasingly widespread tendency in the 
region of cognitive-scientific space occupied by EM to run together certain 
importantly different contemporary styles of thinking about thinking. If Malafouris 
is guilty of this crime, he is far from the only perpetrator. To explain: The wearers 
of intellectual labels such as situated cognition, embodied-embedded cognitive 
science, distributed cognition, enactive cognitive science, and EM are wont to 
march together against the common enemy of a residual Cartesianism in cognitive 
science. Now, I’m as anti-Cartesian as the next right-thinking cognitive theorist 
(see e.g. Wheeler 2005), but the fact remains that even if there is some sense in 
which all these movements are on the same side, their unity against the shared foe 
serves to obscure certain crucial differences between them. (For a related recent 
attempt to distinguish EM from other embodiment-based approaches, see Clark 
forthcoming). I realise that, from the outside, such differences might look nothing 
more than local spats on a par with the tension between the People’s Front of 
Judea and the Judean People’s Front, whose joint opposition to Roman rule is 
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over-ridden by their doctrinal differences. (If this reference is a mystery to you, go 
and watch Monty Python’s Life of Brian – now!). However, whatever the pros and 
cons of pursuing inter-doctrinal disputes in revolutionary politics may be, the 
ignoring of fundamental philosophical differences in cognitive science is a sure-
fire recipe for confusion. There must come a time when it is right to recognise and 
to debate those differences. Indeed, sometimes it’s the conflicts between thinkers 
who are, broadly speaking, on the same side that are the most illuminating. As 
Reg, the leader of the People’s Front of Judea, exclaims, “The only people we hate 
more than the Romans are the… Judean People’s Front.”  
 
 
2. So What Exactly is the Extended Mind Hypothesis?   
 
Here is what I take to be the canonical (and thus the default) statement of EM:  
 
[Under certain conditions, the] organism is linked with an external entity in 
a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a 
cognitive system in its own right. All the components in the system play an 
active causal role, and they jointly govern behavior in the same sort of way 
that cognition usually does. If we remove the external component the 
system’s behavioral competence will drop, just as it would if we removed 
part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts 
equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head. 
(Clark & Chalmers 1998, 7) 
 
This introduces what has come to be known (by those of us affiliated to the EM 
club anyway) as the parity principle. In broad terms the parity principle states that 
if there is equality with respect to governing behaviour, between the causal 
contribution of certain internal elements and the causal contribution of certain 
external elements, then there is no good reason to count the internal elements 
concerned as proper parts of the cognitive system while denying that status to the 
external elements concerned. Parity of causal contribution mandates parity of 
cognitive status. Notice that, as stated, EM does not claim that there are conditions 
under which the very idea of any internal-external boundary becomes problematic 
or misleading. It claims rather that there are conditions under which something 
which counts as a single cognitive system or as a single cognitive process contains 
some elements which are internal and some which are external. The cognitive 
process, and thus the mind, are held to be extended over that still-in-place internal-
external boundary. Of course, this way of talking presupposes that the internal-
external boundary at issue is to be fixed by the limits not of the mind, but by those 
of the brain, or of the skull, or of the central nervous system, or of the skin – take 
your pick. Clark and Chalmers are not specific on this issue, and for present 
purposes we need not be either, since, by the lights of the parity principle, there are 
entities on the external side of any of the latter four interfaces whose causal 
contribution to behaviour (so the EM theorist argues) will end up counting as 
cognitive.          
 
With that clarification on board we can ask the following question: what 
are the benchmarks by which parity of causal contribution is to be judged? Here is 
the wrong way to answer this question. First we fix the benchmarks for what it is 
to count as a proper part of a cognitive system by identifying all the details of the 
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causal contribution made by (say) the brain. Then we look to see if any external 
elements meet those benchmarks. Why is this the wrong way to go? Because it 
opens the door to the following style of anti-EM argument: we identify some 
features of, say, internal memory that are not shared by external memory, and we 
conclude that since the parity principle is not satisfied, EM is false. Rupert (2004) 
uses this very strategy as the first part of his memory-oriented critique of EM. 
Here is his own summary of his own argument:  
 
I argue that the external portions of extended “memory” states (processes) 
differ so greatly from internal memories (the process of remembering) that 
they should be treated as distinct kinds; this quells any temptation to argue for 
[EM] from brute analogy (viz. extended cognitive states are like wholly 
internal ones; therefore, they are of the same explanatory cognitive kind; 
therefore there are extended cognitive states). (Rupert 2004, 407, my 
emphasis) 
 
Rupert proceeds to discuss empirical psychological data which putatively indicate 
significant differences between (a) the profile of internal memory and (b) the 
profile of certain external resources, as such external resources figure in the 
process of remembering. According to Rupert, such differences tell against any 
attempt to see the latter phenomena as being of the same explanatory kind as the 
former. For example, there are psychological experiments which show that 
internal memory is sensitive to what is called the generation effect. Where this 
effect is in evidence, subjects gain a mnemonic advantage by generating their own 
meaningful connections between items be learned.  Rupert argues that the 
generation effect will simply not occur in some extended ‘memory’ systems (e.g., 
in a system according to which, during recall, the subject refers to a notebook in 
which the paired associates are accompanied by connection sentences produced by 
those subjects during learning, but which were entered into the notebook by the 
experimenter). He concedes that it might occur in others (e.g., in a system 
according to which, during recall, the subject refers a notebook in which the paired 
associates to be learned are accompanied by connection sentences produced and 
entered by the subjects during learning). In the latter case, however, he concludes 
that the effect is an accidental feature, rather than a defining dimension, of the 
memory system.  
 
For the sake of argument, let’s just agree that Rupert is right about the 
presence of such differences here. What the fan of EM needs to do is simply refuse 
to accept that one should allow the extant details of internal memory to set the 
benchmarks for what counts as memory in general. To be clear, the Rupert-style 
argument under consideration isn’t suspect in virtue of being anti-EM. Rather it’s 
suspect because it begs the question against EM by assuming that what counts as 
cognitive should be fixed by the fine-grained profile of the inner. Such question-
begging can be avoided, and Rupert’s criticism resisted, if we adopt the following 
alternative strategy for saying what the benchmarks are by which parity of causal 
contribution is to be judged. First we give an account of what it is to be a proper 
part of a cognitive system that is essentially independent of where a candidate 
element happens to be located with respect to the internal-external boundary 
(however that boundary is to be determined). Then we look to see where cognition 
falls – in the brain, in the non-neural body, in the environment, or, as the EM 
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theorist predicts will sometimes be the case, in a system that extends across all of 
these aspects of the world.   
 
Rupert sees this sort of response coming, and so develops his memory-
oriented critique further by arguing that any attempt to fix a generic kind that 
would subsume internal and extended systems would need to be so devoid of 
detail (in order to subsume all the different profiles) that it would fail to earn its 
explanatory keep. But this seems wrong. Indeed, it’s important to note that we 
would surely not intuitively withdraw the epithet ‘memory’ from an internally 
located system which did not exhibit the generation effect, but which continued to 
achieve (something like) the selective storage and context-sensitive retrieval of 
information, so why should we withdraw that epithet from an extended system 
with a similar profile? But if that’s right, why think that exhibiting the generation 
effect is a defining dimension of memory, rather than an accidental feature? This 
gives us some reason to think that there must be a generic account of what 
memory is that covers both cases, and that has explanatory bite. 
 
Here it is worth pausing momentarily to consider a different response to 
the clearly prejudiced fix-according-to-the-inner strategy. According to this 
response, we should first work out the details of what the brain does, and then 
remove from our list of features any details that are inessential to that contribution 
as cognitive. That way we will be able to rule out the arbitrary exclusion of 
external elements and arrive at a viable set of benchmarks for what it is for 
something to count as a proper part of a cognitive system. However, any decent 
version of this response must, it seems, collapse into a version of the strategy that I 
am recommending, since in order for some detail of a causal contribution to be 
judged inessential to that contribution as cognitive, one must have access to an 
independent theory of the cognitive. The alternative, which would involve ruling 
out a detail purely on the grounds that it is not shared by some external element 
under consideration would, of course, beg the question against the opponent of 
EM.   
 
So what sort of overarching theory of the cognitive is favoured by EM 
theorists? As Clark (forthcoming) notes, the fact is that ‘[a]rguments in favour of 
[EM] appeal mainly, if not exclusively, to the computational role played by certain 
kinds of non-neural events and processes in online problem-solving’. In other 
words, EM theorists overwhelmingly conceive of cognition as a matter of 
information processing. Their distinctive observation is that, given this view of 
what cognition is, extra-neural factors – including the stuff of material culture – 
may, in some cases anyway, realise the target phenomenon just as readily as neural 
tissue. For example, taking it that memory is, at least in part, a matter of the 
selective storage and context-sensitive retrieval of information, the EM theorist 
with a cognitive-archaeological bent might contend that information that is poised 
appropriately for context-sensitive retrieval may be stored in a Mycenaean Linear 
B tablet just a readily as in a Mycenaean brain.  
 
 
3. Extended Functionalism and Implementational Materiality 
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Of course, not any old kind of information processing profile will do here. To say 
that it would would be to fall prey to Rupert’s worry about explanatory inefficacy. 
No, genuine cognition will be found only in a (perhaps rather small) subset of 
information processing systems. But whatever the detailed story one eventually 
might arrive at via painstaking philosophical and empirical research, the basic 
commitment to cognition as a kind of information processing is precisely what 
Malafouris thinks of as the kind of residual cognitivism that stymies progress 
towards understanding the rich way in which things may have cognitive lives. As 
Malafouris (2004, 55) puts it, ‘material culture has a place in the mind only as a 
disembodied digit of information written somehow on the neural tissue’. But, he 
argues, material culture has a far richer cognitive life than that image allows. 
Using striking examples from the contributions of artefacts within Mycenaean 
funeral rituals, he suggests that the role of ‘intentional or non-intentional mnemo-
technical artefacts and practices is far more dynamic and dialogical’ and so 
artefact-involving memory is reveals itself to be a ‘process of active discovery 
spanning the monumental and the minute, the conspicuous and the commonplace, 
iconicity and iconoclasm’ (Malafouris 2004, 57).    
 
What is going on here? Although Malafouris doesn’t put things in quite the 
way that I’m about to, his view, I think, is that those objects whose contribution to 
cognitive life is merely a matter of enabling enhanced performance in the storage 
and manipulation of information display only what we might call 
implementational materiality. In other words, given that what is important in 
understanding the mental status of such objects is that they perform certain 
computational functions that are allegedly distinctive of cognitive processing, the 
materiality of those objects is relevant only as the explanation of how the 
computational functions in question are implemented in the physical world.  The 
real explanatory action is reserved for the more abstract, and in some sense non-
material (that is, disembodied), information processing story.  
 
But is EM’s standard reliance on the concept of information the real issue? 
I don’t think so. Let’s allow the EM theorist to shed the grand theory of cognition 
as information processing. Where might she go next? Well, she might preserve 
much of what is important about the computational approach without actually 
thinking of cognition as computation. In other words, she might declare herself to 
be a non-computational functionalist. According to the traditional formulation of 
functionalism in the philosophy of mind, the canonical statement of which is 
arguably due to Putnam (1967), a mental state is constituted by the causal relations 
that it bears to sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and other mental states. The 
information processing theory of cognition, which glosses functional role as 
computational role, is just one possible version of functionalism, so conceived. As 
an alternative to computational functionalism one might, for example, gloss one 
kind of non-computational functional role in terms of maintaining systemic 
stability in a homeostatic dynamical system by keeping the values of certain 
critical variables within certain limits. What this tells us is that the standard way of 
unpacking EM in information processing terms is just one possible version of a 
position that Clark has dubbed extended functionalism (Clark forthcoming). 
According to extended functionalism, a mental state is constituted by the causal 
relations that it bears to systemic inputs, systemic outputs, and other systemic 
states. (This is merely a more general formulation of the functionalist line, one that 
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in principle allows the borders of the cognitive system to fall somewhere other 
than the sensory-motor interface of the organic body.) The very possibility of a 
non-computational extended functionalism shows that information-processing (at 
least as construed in standard cognitive-scientific terms) cannot be at the centre of 
the present issue. For all forms of extended functionalism will be just as 
committed to implementational materiality as the more narrowly defined 
information-processing variety.  
 
To illustrate this point, consider the following example. Air traffic 
controllers typically co-ordinate their activity using flight strips – bands of paper 
printed with flight information (e.g., airline name, flight number, and type of 
aircraft, plus the speed, level, and route of the flight plan, both as requested and as 
authorized). When thinking about how air traffic controllers succeed in their 
complex, high-pressure job, and about how contemporary technology may 
enhance that success, one is inclined to focus, naturally enough, on the information 
carried by these strips. But this is not the only contribution of the strips. Mackay et 
al. (1998) argue convincingly that the physical embodiment of the strips supports a 
number of workplace strategies employed successfully by the controllers. For 
example, individuals often hold the strips as reminders to perform some action, or 
slide them to the left or right to indicate certain conditions (e.g., two planes in a 
potential conflict situation). Moreover, two controllers may work simultaneously 
on the same strip-holding board, using body language to signal the importance of 
particular movements or rearrangements of the strips.  
 
From a practical perspective, this recognition of the non-informational 
contribution of the flight strips is far from idle. The testimonial evidence suggests 
that a number of previous attempts to introduce new computer technology into air 
traffic control may ultimately have been rejected as unworkable by the controllers 
precisely because the proposed replacement systems attempted to reproduce the 
straightforwardly informational aspects of the flight strips while ignoring the extra 
factors. Thus, and recognizing that the non-informational interactions supported by 
the flight strips would be difficult to reconstruct in any keyboard/monitor interface, 
Mackay et al. advocate the use of augmented electronic strips. From a theoretical 
perspective, and pending further analysis, one might at least consider the first two 
of the identified contributions of the flight strips (memory, the modelling of 
possible states of affairs) to put those artefacts in the ballpark to be considered 
elements in the cognitive architecture of the flight controller. And now note that 
nothing about this story undermines the extended functionalist line. The flight 
strips reveal their (provisionally) cognitive status precisely by carrying out certain 
functionally defined systemic roles that are distinctive of cognition (memory, the 
modelling of possible states of affairs). The materiality of the flight strips is thus 
implementational in character.     
 
It is easy enough to see through to theoretical heart of this issue. In order to 
fly, EM needs to embrace a key feature supported by functionalist theorizing – 
namely multiple realizability. A little philosophical history will help here. 
Functionalism (in its non-extended form) freed physicalist philosophy of mind 
from a kind of neural chauvinism. If our mental states were constituted by their 
functional roles, and the material contribution of our brains was merely 
implementational in character, then robots, Martians, Klingons, and gaseous 
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creatures from the outer limits of the universe could all join us in having mental 
states, just so long as the physical stuff out of which they were made could 
implement the right functional profiles. Stretching the word ‘skin’ to include 
boundaries made of tin and gas, traditional functionalism bequeathed to the mind 
what we might call within-the-skin multiple realizability. And within-the-skin 
multiple realizability requires within-the-skin implementational materiality. But 
now extended functionalism merely plays out the same logic beyond the skin. If 
the specific materiality of the substrate doesn’t matter to cognition, outside of the 
fact that it must be able to support the required functional profile, then what, in 
principle, is there to stop things-beyond-the-skin counting as proper parts of a 
cognitive architecture? Nothing, that’s what. And this beyond-the-skin species of 
multiple realizability, which is just another way of characterizing the core 
philosophical commitment of EM, requires beyond-the-skin implementational 
materiality. If we look at things this way, the really radical and revolutionary 
movement was functionalism, not EM. EM simply makes manifest one of the  
implications of functionalism. In other words, EM is just a footnote to Putnam  
 
 
4. Enactivism and Vital Materiality 
 
One could, I suppose, develop a version of EM (as standardly conceived) without 
buying into functionalism, if one could have multiple realizability without 
functionalism. Churchland (2005) has argued recently that the latter is possible. 
But even if one could have EM without functionalism, one couldn’t have EM (as 
standardly conceived) without multiple realizability, and so one couldn’t have EM 
(as standardly conceived) without implementational materiality. Given that 
Malafouris finds implementational materiality wanting as the basis of a full 
account of the cognitive life of material culture, this goes some way towards 
breaking the link between EM and what he calls ‘taking material culture 
seriously’. Now recall that taking material culture seriously means to be 
‘systematically concerned with figuring out the causal efficacy of materiality in the 
enactment and constitution of a cognitive system or operation’ (Malafouris 2004, 
55). So what is this other species of material causal efficacy, the one that, 
according to Malafouris, goes beyond mere implementational materiality, and 
which matters to the cognitive life of things? Let’s label this form of material 
causal efficacy ‘vital materiality’. What, then, is vital materiality? To answer this 
question we need to turn to Malafouris’ compelling image of the potter at her 
wheel.  
 
[The] cognitive map of knowledge and memory may well be extended and 
distributed in the neurons of the potter’s brain, the muscles of the potter’s 
body, the ‘affordances’… of the potter’s wheel, the material properties of 
the clay, the morphological and typological prototypes of existing vessels 
as well as the general social context in which the activity occurs. 
(Malafouris 2004, 59)  
 
So far, nothing new seems to be on the table – or rather the wheel. Indeed, it looks 
as if what we have here is EM. It might seem, therefore, that the lesson of the 
potter’s wheel is that we should replace our view of cognition as residing inside 
the potter’s head, with that of cognition as spatially distributed over brain, body 
and world. But Malafouris develops his case in a different direction: 
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It is at the potter’s fingers that the form and shape of the vessel is perceived 
as it gradually emerges in the interactive tension between the centrifugal 
force and the texture of the wet clay. Materiality enters the cognitive 
equation at a much more basic level, shaping the phenomenology of what 
Searle has defined as the ‘Background’ i.e., the set of non-representational 
mental capacities that enable all representing to take place… In other 
words… we should replace our view of cognition as residing inside the 
potter’s head, with that of cognition enacted at the potter’s wheel. 
(Malafouris 2004, 59)  
 
Clearly, we need to understand the term ‘enacted’. As the references given by 
Malafouris (2004, 57) indicate, the relevant interpretation of this idea is provided 
by (i) the enactive understanding of cognition (henceforth enactivism), as 
developed and defended by Varela et al. (1991; see also Thompson forthcoming), 
construed as a development of (ii) the autopoietic theory of Maturana and Varela 
(1980). And there’s the rub. For as far as I can see, on that interpretation of the 
pivotal idea, cognition enacted cannot be cognition extended. Here’s why.  
 
The smart money says that the theory of autopoiesis (an all-too-brief 
introduction to which will be given in a moment) is a non-negotiable component 
of enactivism. This might come as a surprise to some fans of the enactivist ‘bible’ 
The Embodied Mind (Varela et al. 1991) since that text doesn’t foreground 
autopoiesis as a term, but the fact is that many of the component concepts from 
autopoietic theory, such as autonomy and structural coupling, all appear there in 
pivotal roles, and are used in ways identifiable from the theory of autopoiesis. 
More recently Thompson, in what I believe is poised to become the leading post-
Embodied-Mind development of enactivism, explicitly treats the theory of 
autopoiesis as one of the conceptual keystones of the position (Thompson 
forthcoming, chapter 5).  This suggests that getting straight about autopoiesis will 
help us to understand the enactivist’s core commitments. The bad news for the 
uninitiated is that the theory of autopoiesis is so devilishly complex that I can’t 
hope to do it justice in the space available here. The good news is that I don’t need 
to worry about this exegetical shortfall since I’ll be concerned with the overall 
shape of things, not the fine-grained details. Under such circumstances, the 
roughest of rough guides will do.  
 
Autopoietic systems form a subset of self-organizing systems (Weber and 
Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005), where a self-organizing system is one in which the 
intra-systemic components, on the basis of purely local rules of interaction, 
interact with each other in nonlinear ways to produce the emergence and 
maintenance of structured global order. More specifically, autopoietic systems 
form a subset of autonomous self-organizing systems, where an autonomous 
system is one in which the constituent processes ‘(i) recursively depend on each 
other for their generation and their realization as a network, and (ii) constitute the 
system as a unity in whatever domain they exist’ (Thompson forthcoming, 64). 
Examples of autonomous self-organizing systems include cells, nervous systems 
and insect colonies. However, while self-organization and autonomy are necessary 
for autopoiesis, they are not sufficient. To be autopoietic, a self-organizing 
autonomous system must also, through its own endogenous activity, produce and 
maintain a physical boundary that distinguishes that system as a material unity (a 
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minimal self) in the space in which it exists. The paradigm example of an 
autopoietic system is the single cell (a network of chemical reactions that produces 
its own membrane), and one might reasonably think of the concept of autopoiesis 
as capturing the distinctive mode of systemic organization that is realized in 
material living systems as metabolism (Di Paolo 2005). Crucially, the self-
distinguishing process characteristic of autopoiesis takes place in the face of 
physical perturbations from the system’s environment. This is what autopoietic 
theorists call structural coupling, a process in which an autopoietic system 
encounters its environment while maintaining its organization.  
 
Now for the point of all this. According to Maturana and Varela, 
autopoiesis is necessary and sufficient for life (see e.g. Maturana and Varela 1980, 
82). In other words, for Maturana and Varela, any living system is an autopoietic 
system and any autopoietic system is a living system. But what about cognition? 
One striking claim in the core literature is that living ‘simply’ is cognition: 
‘[l]iving systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of 
cognition’ (Maturana 1970, 13). How could this be? For Maturana, cognition is 
effective (i.e. viability-maintaining) activity in a domain of interactions defined by 
the autopoietic system’s organization. In this context, then, enaction is the process 
by which significance or relevance is brought forth through the viable structural 
coupling of the autopoietic system with its environment. The idea here is that the 
autopoietic organization, in establishing the distinction between the self-
maintenance and the collapse of the system as a unity, institutes a norm of 
survival, and thereby the significance or relevance of certain environmental 
perturbations as either leaving the system organizationally intact or resulting in its 
disintegration. (Notice that the tight link between cognition and autopoiesis 
plausibly introduces something that we might be moved to call ‘vital materiality’ 
in the case of the former, given the stress in the latter on the endogenous 
construction and maintenance of a self-distinguishing material boundary. 
However, as I shall explain later, I don’t think this is the idea that Malafouris has 
in mind.) 
 
Of course, it is possible to hear Maturana’s striking claim in more than one 
way – as advancing either (a) the view that life and cognition are identical, or (b) 
the view that living systems are a subset of cognitive systems (Thompson 2004). 
For the moment let’s work with (a). I’ll come back to (b) later. If the living system 
is identical with the cognitive system, then the boundary of the living system will 
coincide with the boundary of the cognitive system. And it’s this that (finally) 
generates the inconsistency with EM, given, that is, that we accept what I take to 
be a highly plausible claim, namely that where we have an extended cognitive 
system, the living system (the organism, although not necessarily the phenotype) 
remains bounded by its skin. The external elements that, according to EM, count 
as proper parts of the cognitive system do not thereby become proper parts of the 
living organism. They remain abiotic. In other words, and pace Scott Turner 
(2000), organisms don’t extend even if minds and, as Dawkins (1982) pointed out, 
phenotypes do. But if, in cases of extended cognition, the boundary of the 
cognitive system and the boundary of the living system come apart, as I have 
suggested, then one cannot simultaneously sanction EM and identify the cognitive 
system with the living system. Since autopoietic theory (and thus enactivism), on 
our current interpretation, is committed to identifying the cognitive system with 
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the living system, it simply cannot endorse EM. In other words, enacted minds are 
not extended minds. 
 
So far so bad for the attempt to bring EM and enactivism together. But the 
game is not yet over, because a more complex understanding of the relationship 
between life and cognition has recently entered the autopoiesis-enactivist literature 
(Di Paolo 2005; see also Thompson forthcoming). In his later work, Varela (e.g. 
1991) argued that cognition is a process of (what he dubbed) sense-making and 
that living is just such a process. Sense-making enriches the autopoietic picture of 
an enacted domain of significance by introducing the idea that that domain is ‘a 
place of valence, of attraction and repulsion, approach or escape’ (Thompson 
2004, 386). Varela (1991) and Thompson (2004) both suggest that autopoiesis is 
sufficient to instantiate sense-making (hence living is a process of sense-making). 
However, Di Paolo (2005) has argued – convincingly as Thompson (forthcoming) 
notes – that sense-making requires something over and above what we might now 
think of as raw autopoiesis. This is because raw autopoiesis bestows only a kind of 
robustness or conservation of systemic organization in the face of environmental 
perturbation. The system doesn’t alter its behaviour in response to changes in its 
environment. It either survives any perturbations it experiences, or it doesn’t. As 
Di Paolo usefully puts it, the norm of survival as established by raw autopoiesis is 
an all-or-nothing affair. But sense-making (as Thompson’s talk of attraction, 
repulsion, approach and escape indicates) requires a system to be sensitive to 
graded differences between states. The organism needs to monitor how it is doing 
with respect to the norm of survival and to regulate its behaviour accordingly in 
order to improve its situation. In other words, it needs to be an adaptive system.  
 
Crucially, while adaptivity is a phenomenon over and above raw 
autopoiesis, it needs to be established on the basis of autopoietic principles. 
Without the connection to the self-distinguishing process of autopoiesis, the 
meaning generated by adaptivity and sense-making would not be established as 
original to the activity of the system (meaning for the system), but would merely 
be attributable to the system’s activity by some external observer (meaning merely 
ascribed to the system) (Di Paolo 2005; Thompson forthcoming, 231). So, given 
that raw autopoiesis is necessary but not sufficient for sense-making, and given 
that sense-making is to be identified with cognition, raw autopoiesis is necessary 
but not sufficient for sense-making, which means that cognition is sufficient for 
raw autopoiesis. But now since on our revised picture raw autopoiesis remains 
necessary and sufficient for life – Di Paolo never suggests that a raw autopoietic 
system wouldn’t be alive, only that it wouldn’t be a cognitive system – being a 
cognitive system is sufficient for being a living system. And that means that the 
tension between enactivism and EM is still in force. If the enactivist did endorse 
EM, she would (among other things) be claiming (a) that an extended cognitive 
system is an autopoietic system, and thus (b) that an extended cognitive system is 
itself (and not merely contains) a living system. As far as I can see (a) is debatable, 
but in any case (b) violates our highly plausible thought concerning organismic 
extension (or rather the lack of it). Since the enactivist cannot give up on the co-
location of the cognitive system and the living system, she cannot endorse EM. To 
repeat, enacted minds are not extended minds. 
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I conclude that there is a prima facie case for the incompatibility of EM 
and enactivism. There are, of course, further moves that could be made. For 
example, one might try to unpack a recognizably and genuinely enactivist notion 
of cognition in which there is no (explicit or implicit) necessary dependence on the 
phenomenon of autopoiesis, thereby creating conceptual space for the previously 
mentioned view that living systems form a subset of cognitive systems. On this 
account, being an autopoietic (living) system would not be necessary for a system 
to be cognitive. That would allow there to be a cognitive system that is not itself 
identical with some living system, and that would establish consistency with EM, 
since the cognitive system could be extended when the living system is not. The 
plausibility of such an approach cannot be ruled out in advance. At the very least, 
however, I hope to have gestured in the direction of the sorts of sacrifices and 
challenges that the project of developing such a view would face, given the 
autopoietic heritage of enactivism, as standardly conceived. 
 
Aside from (what I have argued) amounts to a parting of the embodied-
embedded ways (and note that I’ve said nothing about which of our two views 
might be correct), it’s also remains unclear, from what I’ve said about enactivism, 
exactly why that approach might be the road to imbuing material culture with 
something that Malafouris would welcome as vital materiality. I shall finish with a 
sketchy remark on this point. The key here is in Malafouris’ claim that the material 
nature of the interactions between the potter’s fingers, the wheel, and the clay 
means that materiality shapes the fundamental phenomenological structure of the 
situation. There is no doubt that this is broadly in line with enactivist theorizing, 
which holds experience to be bodily in character. Let’s say that this is right, and 
that in the end it’s the way that the materiality of things, alongside our own 
embodiment, structures our fundamental phenomenological space, that gives us a 
concept of the vital materiality of material culture. Without further argument, it is 
at least uncertain that this phenomenological point alone could ever mandate the 
claim that things-beyond-the-skin must be counted parts of the cognitive system, 
as opposed to mind-external elements that play a causal role alongside mind-
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